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The Privy Council’s advice on the implication of contract terms in Belize Telecom has, perhaps 
ironically, become an object lesson in the difficulties of interpreting a legal text.
1
 It has been 
observed that Lord Hoffmann’s analysis in Belize ‘means different things to different people.’2 
Over two years after Belize, Arden LJ noted that the courts were ‘probably still absorbing and 
ingesting’ it. 3  Unfortunately, before they fully worked off their meal, the courts have been 
pressed with Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas, a case that is likely to leave them with digestive 




The express terms of a contract will often fail to provide for a certain set of facts. The court will 
usually find that this omission was deliberate: if something was meant to happen, the contract 
would have said so. In some cases, however, the court will ‘imply a term in fact’, finding that the 
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 contract really does provide for the issue, albeit implicitly.
5
 Before Belize Telecom, it was well-
established that the court would only imply a term into a contract if it was necessary to give the 
agreement business efficacy, or if the term was so obvious that it went without saying (the latter 
often illustrated with the ‘officious bystander’ test). If neither test was satisfied, the loss would 
simply lie where it fell. 
 
In Belize, Lord Hoffmann re-conceptualised these two tests as alternative formulations of the 
same question. He claimed that the implication of a term is primarily an exercise in the 
construction of the contract. The only question for the court is a fundamentally interpretative 
one: would the proposed implied term ‘spell out in express words what the instrument, read 
against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean’?6 This formulation 
caused much anxiety. Did Lord Hoffmann mean to change the law, or simply to explain it? In 
Marks and Spencer, the Supreme Court apparently intended to clear this up once and for all. 
Alas, it has produced instead an even more gnomic judgment for the courts to grapple with. 
 
A Marks and Spencer in the lower courts 
 
Marks and Spencer had leased office space in The Point, a building in Paddington, from BNP 
Paribas. The rent was payable in advance on the usual quarter days. The lease was due to end 
on 2 February 2018, although the tenant had the right to determine the lease on 24 January 
2012 by giving six months’ notice. This break notice would only be effective if the rent was not 
in arrears, and if the tenant paid a break premium of £919,800 plus VAT. It will be noted that 
the break date fell between two quarter days. 
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 On 7 July 2011, the tenant served a break notice. On 25 December, it paid the full rent for the 
quarter up to 24 March, and on 18 January 2012, it paid the break premium. Both conditions 
having been satisfied, the lease duly determined on 24 January 2012. The tenant then sought 
repayment of the excess rent it had paid for the remainder of the quarter. It argued that a term 
should be implied into the lease that, if it exercised its right to determine the lease in the middle 
of a quarter, the landlord ought to repay an appropriate proportion of the rent. 
 
At first instance, Morgan J upheld the tenant’s claim.7 Citing Belize Telecom, he asked himself 
whether the proposed term would spell out expressly what a reasonable reader would 
understand the contract to mean.
8
 He observed that, had the break premium been paid before 
25 December, so that it was certain at that date that the break notice would be effective, the 
tenant would have been entitled to pay only a proportionate part of the rent for the quarter. ‘A 
reasonable person reading the lease’ would expect this to be the case no matter when the break 
premium was paid.
9
 He also considered that the parties had intended the break premium to 
represent the full compensation due to the landlord. He concluded that ‘the suggested implied 
term is necessary to give business efficacy to the lease,’ and was ‘obviously what the parties 
meant.’10 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was given by Arden LJ.
11
 She agreed that the judge had 
applied the correct test: the question was whether the term would give effect to the meaning of 
the parties’ agreement.12 However, she found that the test was not satisfied on the facts of the 
case. It would have been obvious to the parties that this situation could arise, but they failed to 
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 provide for it.
13
 They must have known that, at common law, rent payable in advance is not 
apportionable in time.
14
 It therefore appeared that the gap in the contract was deliberate, and 
that the parties intended the common law rule to apply. There was no reason to think that the 
break premium was intended to compensate the landlord in full.
15
 Indeed, the excess rent could 
have been intended to compensate for the uncertainty caused by a later payment of the break 
premium.
16
 As a result, ‘the lease, read as a whole against the relevant background, would not 
reasonably be understood to include’ the proposed term.17 
 
A Marks and Spencer in the Supreme Court 
 
Until this point, there had been no doubt that Belize Telecom was anything other than 
authoritative. The issue was simply how it should be applied to the facts of Marks and Spencer. 
Somewhat surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court was unanimous in dismissing the appeal on 
the facts, but divided on the status of Belize. All five Supreme Court judges considered that the 
term should not be implied into the lease, although only Lord Neuberger gave reasons for this 
decision. He accepted that it seemed unfair that the landlord would retain ‘a pure windfall’ in 
the form of the excess rent,
18
 and that the tenant’s position would change depending on the date 
that the break premium was paid.
19
 On the other hand, the lease was ‘a very detailed document,’ 
drafted by expert solicitors and providing for a large number of contingencies.
20
 It contained a 
carefully constructed set of provisions for the parties’ rights and obligations in relation to the 
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 break clause. It would therefore be ‘inappropriate for the court to step in.’21 Furthermore, since 
it was well-established that the rent would not be apportioned at common law, it would be 
wrong to imply a term to the contrary ‘save in a very clear case indeed.’22 Any unfairness that 




The judges parted ways, however, over the role that Belize Telecom should play in their 
decision. The parties, while both accepting the authority of the case, had argued for different 
interpretations of Lord Hoffmann’s opinion. The tenant contended that Belize had ‘watered 
down’ the traditional tests for implying a term, the landlord that it had not. To resolve this 
dispute, Lord Neuberger, giving the majority judgment, embarked on a thorough overview of 
the law of terms implied in fact. He found that, prior to Belize, the courts took ‘a clear, 
consistent and principled approach.’24 The test was one of ‘business necessity’: the term must be 
necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, or it must be so obvious that it would go 
without saying.
25
 ‘A term should not be implied into a detailed commercial contract merely 
because it appears fair’ or reasonable. 26  He then turned to Belize Telecom, and to Lord 
Hoffmann’s test for the implication of a term: ‘is that what the instrument, read as a whole 
against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?’ Lord Neuberger 
had ‘two points’ to make about this formulation.27  
 
B 1. The legal test for the implication of a term is necessity, not reasonableness. 
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 For Lord Neuberger,  
 
the notion that a term will be implied if a reasonable reader of the contract, 
knowing all its provisions and the surrounding circumstances, would understand it 
to be implied is quite acceptable, provided that (i) the reasonable reader is treated 
as reading the contract at the time it was made and (ii) he would consider the term 
to be so obvious as to go without saying or to be necessary for business efficacy… 
The second proviso is important because otherwise Lord Hoffmann's formulation 





Lord Neuberger considered it ‘necessary to emphasise that there has been no dilution of the 
requirements which have to be satisfied before a term will be implied, because it is apparent 
that Belize Telecom has been interpreted by both academic lawyers and judges as having 
changed the law.’29 He cited a number of academic commentators who have suggested that, 
post-Belize, a term may be implied where it is reasonable, and not just where it is necessary.30 
He also referred to the Singapore Court of Appeal, which has twice refused to follow what it 
saw as the rejection of the ‘business efficacy’ and ‘officious bystander’ tests in Belize.31 The 
Singapore court was, thought Lord Neuberger, ‘right to hold that the law governing the 
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 circumstances in which a term will be implied into a contract remains unchanged following 
Belize Telecom.’32 
 
It may seem odd that Lord Neuberger singled out the Singapore Court of Appeal for praise in 
this regard, when the English Court of Appeal has also found that the law on implied terms was 
unchanged by Belize. As Lord Clarke MR observed in The Reborn, Lord Hoffmann was ‘not 
in any way resiling from the often stated proposition that it must be necessary to imply the 
proposed term. It is never sufficient that it should be reasonable.’33 Lord Carnwath pointed out 
that the Court of Appeal has not departed from this analysis of Belize since.34 The High Court 
has taken a similar approach.
35
 Even critics of Belize admit that it does not seem to have 
changed the approach of the English courts, although they tend to portray this as out-and-out 




The temptation to assert that Lord Hoffmann was perfectly clear must be resisted, given the 
number of commentators who have found him to be perfectly clear in his support of a wide 
range of incompatible views. But to argue that Lord Hoffmann altered the test from necessity to 
reasonableness is to fixate on the adjective ‘reasonable’ without considering the noun to which it 
is attached. To ask what a ‘reasonable person’ must understand the contract to mean does not 
add much to asking what the contract must mean, given that the reasonable person is only a 
cipher for the court.
37
 The real ambiguity arises from the fact that speaking of a test of 
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 ‘reasonableness’ or ‘necessity’ is entirely unhelpful. As McCaughran has noted, it is simply 
incomplete; the real question we need to ask is: ‘reasonable or necessary for what?’38 Belize 





Carter and Courtney object that this is sneaking in reasonableness by the back door. 
‘Reasonable people are apt to come to reasonable conclusions.’ Thus, a reasonable person is 
likely to imply a term, not only when it will give effect to the contract’s meaning, but also when 
it will give the contract a more reasonable meaning.
40
  This must, they argue, mean that terms 
are easier to imply under Belize Telecom, despite Lord Hoffmann’s protests to the contrary.41 
But they underestimate the abilities of the reasonable reader. A reasonable person, reading a 
detailed commercial contract, will begin from the assumption that the parties have expressed all 
the terms they intended to include.
42
 It will therefore be reasonable for her to require a very 
clear case for the implication of a term. Conversely, she would judge it unreasonable to imply a 
term just because it would make the contract fairer. That would betray a failure to understand 
the nature of commercial contracts, in which the parties deliberately attempt to express all of 
their intended meanings in a quest for predictability.
43
 This basic fact about contracts, and not 
the talismanic word ‘necessity’, is the reason for the strict test applied in implication cases. 
 
Now, as Hooley observes, reasonableness must be part of the endeavour.
44
 We must construe 
the contract reasonably to see if an implied term is necessary to achieve its purpose. As Lord 
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 Hoffmann pointed out in Belize, ‘a contract may work perfectly well in the sense that both 
parties can perform their express obligations, but the consequences would contradict what a 
reasonable person would understand the contract to mean.’45 Lord Neuberger accepted that this 
kind of ‘value judgment’ will inevitably be involved, given that the test is not one of ‘absolute 
necessity.’46 
 
Lord Carnwath agreed with the majority that Belize did not ‘water down’ the traditional 
standard of necessity. Oddly, however, he seemed to equate this standard with ‘absolute 
necessity (ie the contract simply will not operate without the term),’ rather than ‘reasonable 
necessity (ie the contract will not operate as it must reasonably have been intended by the 
parties to operate).’47 But as Lord Neuberger observed, absolute necessity has never been the 
standard. In The Moorcock, for example, the contract would have been perfectly workable 
without the implied term: it would simply have thrown all the risk on the hapless shipowner, 
something the court presumed the parties could not possibly have intended.
48
 It is not even 
clear what a standard of absolute necessity would look like. How ‘unworkable’ would the 
contract have to be before a term could be implied? Asking whether the contract would ‘work’ 
without the term is, effectively, begging the question. 
 
The real danger is not that the courts will choose a test of ‘reasonableness’ over ‘necessity’. It is 
that they will allow themselves too much leeway in identifying what the term must be necessary 
to achieve. As Lord Grabiner has warned, in both interpretation and implication cases, the 
court must find the meaning of the contract from the words used by the parties, not from their 
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 own ideas of commercial common sense.
49
 If this is done, we need not fear that Belize will 




Belize, then, explained the relevance of necessity for the implication of terms; it did not 
dispense with it. The Supreme Court was unanimous on this point, and was right to quash 




B 2. Interpretation and implication are separate and sequential processes. 
 
It was in relation to Lord Neuberger’s second point that the judges began to part ways. This 
concerned Lord Hoffmann’s ‘suggestion that the process of implying a term is part of the 
exercise of interpretation.’52 Lord Neuberger accepted that the construction of words and the 
implication of terms both ‘involve determining the scope and meaning of the contract.’ 53 
However, he argued that they are ‘different processes governed by different rules,’54 and are 
carried out at different times.
55
 The court cannot consider whether or not to imply a term until 
it has decided what the express words mean.
56
 Furthermore, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
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 observed in Philips Electronique, the implication of terms is a much more ‘intrusive’ exercise 




For Lord Carnwath, the relationship between interpretation and implication was ‘an interesting 
debating point’, but ‘of little practical significance.’58 He did, however, prefer the view that they 
are ‘two sides of the same coin.’59 The court in Philips was not attempting to separate the two, 
but to emphasise that it will be an unusual case in which the court will imply a term.
60
 Cases like 
Aberdeen City Council, in which the court treated implication and interpretation as ‘part of a 
single exercise,’ did not bear out the view that they were two separate and sequential processes.61 
Rather, such cases exemplified what Lord Grabiner has described as an ‘iterative’ process, in 





Lord Carnwath’s approach is preferable here, and the point has more practical significance than 
he admitted. As Kramer has observed, implication is an inevitable part of communication. We 
cannot convey everything we mean expressly; we must rely on a shared background of norms 
and assumptions.
63
 Contract law would be unable to function adequately without recognising this 
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Lord Neuberger objected that ‘to speak of construing the contract as a whole, including the 
implied terms, is not helpful, not least because it begs the question as to what construction 
actually means in this context.’ 65  However, this assumes that a line can be drawn between 
express and implied terms, when in fact the two shade into each other. Where an implied term 
states the necessary meaning of the express terms, ‘the implication is the meaning, or part of the 
meaning, of [the express] terms.’66 In Aberdeen City Council, for example, the court concluded 
that the meaning of the contract could equally be conveyed through a re-interpretation of the 
express terms, or by the implication of a new term.  
 
If interpretation and implication are simply two ways of conveying meaning, to treat them 
differently is to create incoherence in the law. As Arden LJ observed in Stena Line, Belize 
 
promotes the internal coherence of the law by emphasising the role played by the 
principles of interpretation not only in the context of the interpretation of 
documents simpliciter but also in the field of the implication of terms. Those 
principles are the unifying factor. The internal coherence of the law is important 
because it enables the courts to identify the aims and values that underpin the law 
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 To this end, Kramer suggests, it would be better to see interpretation and implication as 
occupying positions on a continuous spectrum, rather than separate sides of a bright line.
68
 And 
this would fit the existing law well. There is no ‘radical change’ from a standard of 
reasonableness in interpretation to one of necessity in implication.
69
 Both doctrines require the 
court to do what is necessary to give effect to the meaning that the contract is reasonably 
understood to convey. It will simply be rare for the court to find that a detailed commercial 
contract conveys a meaning that is not set out in express words, just as it is rare to find that the 
parties did not intend the ordinary meaning of the words they used.
 70
 This explains the court’s 
cautious approach in Philips Electronique. 
 
The divide between interpretation and implication is a superficial one. In fact, treating them as 
separate doctrines with different rules leads to incoherence, unpredictability and unprincipled 
law. It also fails to adequately explain the conceptual basis for implying terms. In interpretation 
cases, we could just as easily ask whether the proposed interpretation is necessary for business 
efficacy, or is obviously that intended by the parties. However, we recognise that, by themselves, 
these tests would fail to cut to the core of what such cases are really about: the search for the 
meaning of the contract. This applies equally to the  implication of terms. 
 
A What next for implied terms? 
 
The Privy Council’s decision in Belize Telecom did not alter the substantive law; rather, it 
brought welcome coherence to it. It clarified that the traditional tests are not ends in 
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 themselves, but part of a wider search for the meaning and purpose of the contract. It is 
therefore disappointing to have doubt thrown upon it now. For Lord Neuberger concluded his 
discussion of Belize with the following: 
 
It is true that Belize Telecom was a unanimous decision of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council and that the judgment was given by Lord Hoffmann, whose 
contributions in so many areas of law have been outstanding. However, it is 
apparent that Lord Hoffmann's observations in Belize Telecom… are open to 
more than one interpretation on the two points identified… above, and that some 
of those interpretations are wrong in law. In those circumstances, the right course 
for us to take is to say that those observations should henceforth be treated as a 





It is not clear why Lord Neuberger thought that this was the ‘right course’ to take. If the issue 
was that some interpretations of Belize were wrong in law, surely it would have been easier to 
correct them, and reaffirm that Lord Hoffmann’s opinion, properly interpreted, remained 
authoritative. It is an even more peculiar step to take if it is right that Belize did not change the 
law. And it creates new uncertainty: to what extent should the courts take into account the 
guidance offered by an unauthoritative but ‘characteristically inspired discussion’? 
 
It was on this treatment of Belize that Lord Carnwath dissented from Lord Neuberger’s 
majority judgment. The court, he held, would ‘need very good reasons for treating [Belize] as 
less than authoritative.’ Although Lord Hoffmann’s speech had ‘stimulated more than usual 
academic controversy,’ this was not ‘a sufficient reason to question its continuing authority.’ 
Indeed, ‘properly understood,’ it was ‘a valuable and illuminating synthesis of the factors which 
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 should guide the court.’72 Lord Clarke agreed that Belize did not change the law, but did not 




If Belize is to be disregarded, then, what happens next? Lord Neuberger did not explicitly set 
out the test that the courts should be using now that Belize is out of favour. The first part of his 
judgment suggests that he wished to return to the traditional tests, without overlaying them with 
what Arden LJ described as the ‘superstructure of interpretation’.74 On this view, the court 
should ask whether the contract ‘would lack commercial or practical coherence’ without the 
implied term. Alternatively, it should ask whether ‘notional reasonable people in the position of 
the parties at the time at which they were contracting’ would regard the term as so obvious that 
it went without saying.
75
 However, it should not engage with the broader interpretative question 
of the contract’s overall meaning.  
 
To some extent, this approach is borne out by his analysis of the facts of Marks and Spencer. 
Lord Neuberger reaffirmed that the question was whether the term was ‘necessary for business 
efficacy.’76 However, he did not fully explain why this test was not satisfied on the facts, instead 
substituting it with a range of similarly stern phrases. For example, the court would not imply a 
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 term where there was only ‘an arguable lacuna’;77 there must be ‘a very clear case indeed.’78 It 
was not sufficient that the contract would work ‘rather unfairly’ without the implied term,79 nor 
that its result was ‘somewhat curious… capricious or anomalous.’80 Instead, the contract must be 
‘unworkable,’ in the sense that it was ‘commercially or otherwise absurd.’81 By finding that the 
lease without the term was merely ‘capricious’ rather than ‘absurd’, Lord Neuberger held that 
the business necessity test was not satisfied. But Lord Carnwath, as well as the three Court of 
Appeal judges, had reached the same conclusion by applying the test in Belize Telecom. What 
difference did Lord Neuberger’s approach really make? 
 
Unfortunately, Lord Carnwath did not explain his reasoning process, simply agreeing with Lord 
Neuberger on the facts. However, it is clear that he thought the Belize approach involved a less 
rigid application of the traditional tests, rooted in the broader question of the contract’s 
meaning.
82
 In the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ gave noticeably more time to considering what the 
purpose of the contractual provisions might have been, as did Morgan J, applying Belize at first 
instance. Both, for example, asked what the aim of the break premium was intended to be. 
Lord Neuberger, however, preferred to consider whether the contract functioned as a rational 
free-standing scheme. He focused on what was necessary to give the contract ‘commercial or 
practical coherence’, rather than what was ‘necessary to achieve the parties' objective in entering 
                                                        
77
 ibid [40]. 
78
 ibid [50]. 
79
 ibid [49]. 
80
 ibid [51]. 
81
 ibid. It is instructive to compare this list of adjectives to one offered by Neuberger LJ in the context of 
interpretation: the court will depart from the natural meaning of the term if it is ‘plainly ridiculous or 
unreasonable,’ but not if it is merely ‘somewhat unexpected, a little unreasonable, or not commercially 
very wise’: Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil v Somerfield Stores [2006] EWCA Civ 1732, [21]-[22]. 
82
 n 4 above, [73]. 
 into the agreement.’83 The danger here is that the courts may prioritise their own notions of 





As Peden has observed, the traditional approach to implied terms encouraged judges to set out 
the two tests and then their conclusions, without explaining the reasoning process that 
connected the two.
85
 Lord Neuberger’s approach may do the same. At least Belize required the 
courts to clarify the objectives to which they were giving business efficacy. It has been argued 
that downgrading the traditional tests led to greater uncertainty in the law, but certainty does not 
consist of some rote phrases that disguise the true reasons for a decision. In any case, certainty 
is not the only aim of contract law. When asking questions about meaning, a high level of 
certainty cannot be reached ‘without sacrificing fairness and justifiability.’86 
 
Mitchell has identified Belize as part of a trend in which emphasis shifted from free-standing 
rules of contract law to a greater focus on the interpretation and application of the contract 
itself.
87
 It is possible that its rejection in Marks and Spencer marks the beginning of the end of 
contract law’s ‘interpretative turn’. Admittedly, implication of terms was always an outlier in this 
trend, given that the traditional rules also stress fidelity to the parties’ intentions.88 However, 
pronouncements that interpretation ought to know its place certainly run counter to the trend 
of recent decades. Perhaps contract law is now prepared to reassert itself as a means of shaping 
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 obligations, rather than simply discovering and implementing them.
89
 However, any attraction 
such a development might hold depends on its doctrines being clear, consistent and principled. 
Alas, that is not the case here. Marks and Spencer has swept away the theoretical basis for terms 
implied in fact without putting anything in its place. 
 
The Supreme Court reached the correct decision on the facts of Marks and Spencer. Given the 
length of the contract (some 70 pages), it would have been very strange if the parties had left 
such a significant term to implication. But this decision could have been reached in a more 
conceptually satisfying way if the majority had followed Lord Hoffmann’s approach whole-
heartedly. 
 
Great things were initially prophesied for Belize Telecom: Lord Clarke MR thought that it 
would be ‘as much referred to’ as Investors Compensation Scheme.90 It will be a great shame if 
it is left to languish in obscurity now. While not substantially changing the law, it brought clarity 
and coherence to an area where these were sorely lacking. If judgments are to be jettisoned 
simply because they stimulate academic debate, there would be no law worth having. It is not 
clear why Lord Neuberger felt the need to throw cold water over Belize, but it is to be hoped 
that Lord Hoffmann’s incisive and helpful analysis will continue to influence the courts 
regardless. 
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89
 It may be significant that another recent Supreme Court case, El Makdessi v Cavendish Square 
Holdings BV & Anr [2015] 1 WLR 1373, reaffirmed the traditional rule against penalties in the face of 
arguments that the parties’ agreement ought to prevail. 
90
 n 33 above, 913. 
